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  The	   Naval	   Postgraduate	   School	   (NPS)	   hosted	   a	   Track	   II	   dialogue	   on	   weapons	   of	   mass	  destruction	  and	  regional	  security	   in	   Istanbul	   from	  October	  31	  to	  November	  2,	  2012.	  This	  event	  was	  supported	  and	  executed	  by	  the	  Project	  on	  Advanced	  Systems	  and	  Concepts	  for	  Countering	  WMD	  (PASCC)	  of	  the	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict.	  PASCC	  is	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency	  (DTRA).	  The	   participants	   included	   four	   main	   presenters	   from	   both	   Turkey	   and	   U.S.	   who	  specialize	  in	  security,	  global	  proliferation,	  disarmament,	  and	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  policy.	  Also	  present	  were	  observers	  from	  the	  Turkish	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  DTRA,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace,	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Ankara	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Consulate	  in	  Istanbul.	  The	  dialogue	  was	  structured	  like	  an	  academic	  seminar	  with	  multiple	  sessions	  during	  which	  each	  panelist	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  deliver	  20	  minutes	  of	  prepared	  remarks.	  Each	  session	  provided	  a	  period	  for	  open	  discussion	  among	  all	  the	  participants.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  three-­‐day	  event,	  there	  was	  a	  "Ways	  Forward"	  session	  involving	  all	  participants	   in	  a	  frank	  review	  of	  all	  topics	  that	  had	  been	  addressed	  as	  well	  as	  consideration	  of	  points	  for	  further	  discussion.	  The	  overall	   tenor	  of	  the	  dialogue	  was	  forthright	  and	  free-­‐flowing.	  U.S.	  and	  Turkish	  participants,	  including	  observers,	  stressed	  how	  much	  they	  had	  learned	  from	  the	  exchange.	  Participants	   noted	   that	   there	   are	   only	   a	   handful	   of	   experts	   in	   Turkey	   who	   specialize	   in	  nuclear	   security.	   	   Track	   II	   dialogues,	   such	   as	   this,	   are	   an	   ideal	   venue	   to	   bring	   nuclear	  experts	   together	  with	  members	   of	   Turkey's	   nascent	   civil	   society,	   government	   and	   other	  local	  sectors.	  The	  following	  sections	  describe	  major	  themes	  of	  discussion	  at	  the	  dialogue.	  
	  
AMERICAN	  AND	  TURKISH	  PERSPECTIVES	  ON	  SECURITY	  AND	  
COOPERATION	  	  During	  an	  overview	  of	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	   in	  regional	  security,	  U.S.	  participants	  determined	  several	  key	  objectives	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Mediterranean	  that	  




are	  crucial	   to	  U.S.	  well-­‐being	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  U.S.	  allies.	   	  These	   included:	  promoting	  security	  among	  American	  allies	  (Israel,	  Turkey,	  Gulf	  States,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Iraq,	  and	  Egypt);	  assuring	   the	   free	   flow	   of	   resources,	   especially	   oil	   and	   natural	   gas,	   and	   access	   to	   those	  resources;	   preventing	  Middle	  Eastern	   states	   from	  acquiring	  nuclear	  weapons;	   promoting	  human	  rights;	  aiding	  in	  the	  development	  of	  stable	  democracies;	  and,	  persuading	  groups	  to	  eschew	  violent	  extremism	  and	  confront	  the	  causes	  of	  terrorism.	  	  Turkey’s	   principal	   foreign	   policy	   and	   security	   challenges,	   as	   one	   Turkish	   participant	  noted,	  are	  numerous.	  In	  addition	  to	  long-­‐standing	  internal	  security	  concerns	  related	  to	  the	  country’s	   restive	   Kurdish	   population,	   Ankara	   continues	   to	   struggle	   to	   address	   the	  implications	  of	  the	  violence	  in	  Syria	  and	  the	  uncertainties	  left	  by	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  American	  participants	  added	  that	  there	  were	  additional	  issues	  that	  concerned	  Turkish	  policymakers,	  such	  as	  access	  to	  sources	  of	  energy	  and	  maintaining	  good	  relations	  with	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  and	  the	  Kurdish	  Regional	  Government.	   In	   considering	  Turkey’s	   rise	   as	   a	   regional	   power,	  Turkish	  participants	  also	  noted	  regional	  suspicions	  towards	  Ankara’s	  new	  hegemonic	  status	  (often	  referred	  to	  as	  Turkey’s	  “neo-­‐Ottoman”	  foreign	  policy).	  	  	  	  In	  considering	  these	  challenges,	  one	  Turkish	  participant	  suggested	  that	  greater	  regional	  economic	   integration	  with	   the	  Arab	  world	  may	   lead	   to	  greater	  stability	  and	  peace.	   In	   the	  last	  ten	  years,	  Turkey	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  hub	  for	  trade	  in	  the	  greater	  Middle	  East,	  a	  status	  that	   has	   already	   led	   to	   greater	   economic	   and	   political	   interdependence	   in	   the	   region.	  Considering	   the	   positive	   impact	   cooperation	   within	   the	   European	   Union	   has	   had	   upon	  resolving	  conflict	  among	  its	  members,	  Turkish	  participants	  advocate	  the	  need	  to	  broaden	  	  regional	  Middle	  Eastern	  security	  diplomatic	  approaches	  to	  include	  economic	  integration	  as	  a	   means	   to	   promote	   Turkish	   and	   collective	   security.	   Participants	   admitted	   that	   an	  economically	  central	  and	  politically	  vibrant	  Turkey	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  coordinate	  solutions	  to	   all	   problems	   facing	   the	   region.	  However,	   improved	   economic	   integration,	   as	  means	   of	  securing	   peace	   and	   stability	   in	   the	   greater	   Middle	   East,	   in	   the	   estimate	   of	   Turkish	  participants,	   remains	   a	   “long-­‐term	   project”	   that	   requires	   close	   collaboration	   with	   the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  European	  Union.	  




American	   participants	   acknowledged	   that	   Turkey	   was	   increasingly	   important	   to	  resolving	   several	   important	   regional	   security	   challenges,	   and	   that	   Turkey's	   role	   would	  grow	  stronger	   in	   the	  years	  ahead.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Turkey	  do	  not	  need	  to	  agree	  on	  everything;	  allies	  do	  not	  always	  agree	  (as	  seen	   in	  Franco-­‐American	  relations).	  During	  the	  dialogue	  for	  example,	  Turkish	  and	  American	  panelists	  differed	  in	  their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Montreux	   Convention	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   American	   military	   interests	   in	   the	   Black	   Sea.	  Considering	  the	  durability	  of	  Turkish-­‐American	  relations	  since	  World	  War	  II,	  both	  Turkish	  and	  American	  panelists	  agreed	  that	  Ankara	  and	  Washington	  are	  capable	  of	  meeting	  future	  challenges	  in	  cooperative	  and	  constructive	  ways.	  
	  
TURKEY,	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES,	  AND	  EXTENDED	  DETERRENCE	  	  The	   dialogue	   set	   out	   to	   examine,	   among	   other	   things,	   the	   respective	   U.S.	   and	   Turkish	  understandings	  of	  extended	  deterrence	  and	  how	   this	  may	  have	  changed	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  environment.	  Overall	  the	  dialogue's	  participants	  recognized	  that,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	   of	   confluence	   between	   U.S.	   and	   Turkish	   perceptions	   of	   the	   emerging	   security	  challenges	   in	   the	   region,	   Turkey	   is	   currently	   satisfied	  with	   the	   status	   of	   nuclear	   burden-­‐sharing	  within	   the	  NATO	  context.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  variables	   that	   could	  change	   the	  situation:	  a	  change	  in	  Turkish	  leadership,	  an	  American	  lapse	  into	  isolationism,	  a	  collapse	  of	  the	   Non-­‐Proliferation	   Treaty	   (NPT),	   a	   change	   in	   threat	   perception,	   or	   possibly	   some	  combination	  of	  these	  variables.	  Panelists	  felt	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Turkey	  had	  a	  strong	  relationship	  in	  part	  due	  to	   their	  work	  with	  NATO.	  Evidence	  demonstrating	  Turkey's	   full	   support	   for	  bilateral	  and	  NATO	   commitments	   include	   the	   NATO	  missile	   defense	   arrangements	   and	   the	   continued	  deployment	  of	  U.S.	  non-­‐strategic	  nuclear	  weapons	  at	  Incirlik	  Air	  Base	  in	  Turkey.	  Yet	  with	  NATO's	   failure	   to	   respond	   to	  Turkish	   requests	   for	  military	  help	   in	  1991	  and	  2003,	   there	  remain	  lingering	  doubts	  about	  whether	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  assist	  Turkey	  if	   called	   upon	   under	   Article	   V.	   	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   some	   Turkish	   panelists,	   "the	  credibility"	   of	   NATO	   and	   the	   U.S.	   support	   of	   Turkey's	   security	   interests	   is	   further	  complicated	  by	  problems	   such	   as	   terrorism	   (Turkey's	   long-­‐standing	   fight	  with	   the	  PKK);	  




Turkey’s	  new	  oil	  deal	  with	  Kurdistan;	  Cyprus;	  questions	  over	  Iran's	  efforts	  to	  gain	  nuclear	  capabilities;	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Given	   the	   possibility	   that	   some	   NATO	   members	   (Germany,	   Belgium,	   and	   the	  Netherlands)	  might	   decide	   to	   unilaterally	   ask	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   from	  their	   territories,	   participants	   questioned	   how	   Ankara	  would	   react	   if	   Turkey	   became	   the	  only	  NATO	  member	  to	  host	  nuclear	  weapons.	  There	  was	  disagreement	  among	  participants	  over	  NATO’s	   future	  as	  a	  nuclear	  alliance	  and	  its	  perpetuation	  on	  the	  merits	  of	   its	  nuclear	  capabilities.	  Turkish	  participants	  believed	  their	  country	  would	  not	  remain	  the	  only	  NATO	  member	   to	   retain	   nuclear	   weapons	   because	   it	   would	   create	   the	   image	   of	   Turkey	   as	   an	  American	   puppet.	   One	   participant	   suggested	   returning	   the	   nuclear	  weapons	   before	   they	  are	   rescinded;	   this	   would	   allow	   Turkey	   to	   maintain	   Ankara’s	   highly	   regarded	   regional	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	  leadership	  position.	  Some	   participants	   argued	   that	   nuclear	   weapons	   are	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   NATO's	  defense	   and	   deterrence	   posture	   and	   that	   this	   debate	   is	   officially	   closed	   for	   the	   next	   ten	  years;	   however,	   there	   was	   not	   universal	   agreement	   on	   this	   point.	   Nevertheless,	   burden	  sharing	   is	   essential	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   alliance's	   nuclear	   policy	   and	   Turkey	   fully	  understands	  this	  role.	  Despite	  the	  many	  future	  temptations	  that	  may	  make	  Turkey	  consider	  developing	   its	   own	  nuclear	   program,	   there	  will	   be	   no	   desire	   for	   Turkey	   to	   have	   its	   own	  nuclear	  capacity	  as	  long	  as	  burden	  sharing	  and	  the	  nuclear	  regime	  remain	  strong.	  	  Several	   participants	   acknowledged	   the	   difficulty	   of	   Turkey's	   situation:	   it	   has	   to	  promote	   non-­‐proliferation	  while	   continuing	   to	   host	   U.S.	   nuclear	  weapons.	  Moreover,	   the	  present	  consensus	  deems	  NATO’s	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  capabilities	  sufficient.	  Yet,	  one	  American	  participant	  claimed	  that	  Turkey	  is	  establishing	  a	  ballistic	  missile	  program.	  While	  one	   participant	   posed	   that	   this	   ballistic	   missile	   program	   is	   under	   development	   to	   help	  Turkey	  "feel	  safe,"	  others	  suggested	  that	  there	  was	  a	  residual	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  U.S.	  and	  NATO	   security	   assurances.	   As	   evidence,	   Turkish	   participants	   pointed	   out	   that	   NATO	  nuclear	  weapons	  presently	  deployed	  in	  Turkey	  are	  not	  readily	  available	  for	  military	  usage.	  U.S.	  participants	  agreed	  in	  principle,	  explaining	  that	  they	  instead	  serve	  a	  political	  purpose:	  they	   primarily	   act	   as	   a	   glue	   to	   reinforce	   NATO’	   s	   strength	   and	   burden	   sharing,	   while	  allowing	  for	  a	  prominent	  or	  dominant	  U.S.	  role.	  	  




NATO’s	   “missile	   shield”	   adds	   another	   dimension	   of	   deterrence	   and	   “assurances”	  shared	   between	   Turkey	   and	   the	   alliance.	   Like	   the	   placement	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	  within	  Turkish	  territory,	  one	  Turkish	  participant	  suggested	  that	  Ankara	  does	  consider	  the	  missile	  defense	   to	   be	   a	   “highly	   valuable	   strategic	   asset”	   for	   Turkey’s	   protection.	   Nonetheless,	  according	   to	   Turkish	   participants,	   several	   reservations	   and	   concerns	   have	   accompanied	  Ankara’s	   participation	   in	   hosting	   the	   system’s	   radar	   facilities.	   First,	   Turkey	   wants	   the	  missile	  shield	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  NATO	  project	  rather	  than	  a	  U.S.	  endeavor.	  Turkish	  memories	  of	   the	   Cuban	  Missile	   Crisis	   (which	   entailed	   the	   unilateral	   withdrawal	   of	   Jupiter	  missiles	  from	  the	  country)	  have	  led	  to	  some	  apprehension	  towards	  complete	  American	  control	  over	  the	  project.	  Second,	  Ankara	  has	  expressed	  concern	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   the	  shield	  is	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  entirety	  of	  Turkey’s	  territory.	  They	  worry	  that	  it	  would	  be	  used	   to	   defend	   Israel	   against	   attacks.	   Third,	   Ankara	   remains	   adamant	   that	   no	   state	  (particularly	  Iran)	  should	  be	  named	  the	  target	  of	  the	  system’s	  defensive	  posturing.	  Turkish	  participants	  underscored	  that	  Turkey’s	  warm	  relations	  with	  Iran,	  as	  well	  as	  fears	  that	  Iran	  would	  exploit	  such	  a	  declaration	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  military	  capabilities,	  were	  the	  two	  factors	  influencing	  the	  AKP’s	  position	  on	  NATO’s	  missile	  defense	  system.	  	  
IRAN	  AND	  THE	  NON-­‐PROLIFERATION	  TREATY	  	  	  In	   general,	   American	   participants	   underscored	   the	   dire	   implications	   of	   Iran’s	   potential	  nuclear	   weapons	   program.	   An	   Iranian	   nuclear	   bomb	   was	   characterized	   as	   a	   potentially	  “devastating	   blow”	   to	   the	   NPT.	   While	   there	   was	   some	   reason	   for	   optimism	   regarding	  rumors	  of	  direct	  talks	  between	  Washington	  and	  Tehran,	  one	  American	  participant	  asserted	  that	   there	   was	   a	   “shared	   sense”	   in	   both	   Turkey	   and	   the	   United	   States	   that	   the	   Obama	  administration’s	   policies	   towards	   Iran	   “had	   not	   succeeded	   to	   date.”	   In	   the	  words	   of	   one	  American	  participant,	  Turkey’s	  “unique	  and	  complicated”	  relationship	  with	  Iran,	  as	  well	  as	  Washington’s	  weakened	  diplomatic	  posture	  (due	  to	   the	  Arab	  Spring)	   further	  complicated	  counter-­‐proliferation	   efforts.	   In	   order	   to	   overcome	   these	   potential	   roadblocks,	   “new	  strategic	   commitments”	   could	   be	   made	   to	   Turkey	   and	   the	   Gulf	   states,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  construction	  of	  an	  expanded	  cooperative	  effort	  on	  missile	  defense.	  	  	  




Turkish	  participants	  raised	  a	  number	  of	  strategies	  whereby	  Turkey	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  helping	  to	  uphold	  and	  enforce	  the	  current	  non-­‐proliferation	  regime.	  As	  of	  now,	   it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  Ankara	  can	  play	  a	  direct	  diplomatic	  role	  in	  diffusing	  the	  situation	  with	  Iran,	  particularly	   due	   to	   the	   current	   row	   between	   Ankara	   and	   Tehran	   over	   Syria.	   Placing	  conditions	   or	   restraints	   upon	   the	   nuclear	   fuel	   cycle	   would	   have	   a	   high	   impact	   upon	  proliferation;	  however,	   there	   is	  much	  apprehension	   internationally	  about	   the	  question	  of	  establishing	  an	  international	  fuel	  bank.	  During	  the	  discussions,	  participants	  recommended	  a	  U.S.-­‐Turkey	  dialogue	   focusing	   specifically	   on	   the	   fuel	   cycle.	   Importantly,	   the	   aim	  of	   the	  dialogue	  should	  not	  be	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  convince	  Turkish	  policymakers	  to	  accept	  a	  UAE-­‐type	  constraint	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  domestic	  fuel	  cycle	  capabilities.	  One	  Turkish	   participant	   spoke	   favorably	   about	   the	   benefits	   of	   export	   controls	   for	  maintaining	   the	   NPT,	   an	   option	   that	   would	   have	   greater	   likelihood	   of	   success.	   Turkey’s	  current	   approach	   to	   export	   controls	   is	   very	   much	   in	   line	   with	   international	   standards.	  However,	   participants	   were	   reminded	   that	   greater	   intelligence	   sharing	   is	   critical	   to	   the	  future	  of	  export	  controls.	  	  Turkish	  participants	  cited	  the	  possible	  creation	  of	  a	  “Nuclear	  Weapons	  Free	  Zone”	  (NWFZ)	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enforcing	  the	  NPT.	  Turkey	  has	  recently	  changed	  its	   stance	   from	   a	   non-­‐interested	   observer	   to	   an	   active	   player	   championing	   such	   a	   zone.	  Ankara’s	  change	  in	  policy	  on	  the	  NWFZ	  is	  seen	  in	  part	  as	  a	  means	  to	  realign	  Turkey	  into	  a	  negotiating	  position	  on	  Iran’s	  own	  nuclear	  ambitions	  as	  well	  as	  a	  way	  to	  pressure	  Israel	  on	  its	  nuclear	  program.	  
	  
THE	  NPT	  AND	  U.S.-­‐TURKISH	  RELATIONS	  	  Turkey’s	   rise	   in	   international	   stature,	   as	   well	   as	   changes	   in	   approach	   towards	   foreign	  relations,	   has	   led	   to	   a	   desire	   in	   Ankara	   to	  mediate	   between	   nuclear	   “haves”	   and	   “have-­‐nots.”	  Turkey	  and	  the	  United	  States	  do	  see	  eye-­‐to-­‐eye	  on	  many	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  NPT.	  Strain	   or	   disagreement	   between	  Washington	   and	   Ankara	   is	  most	   visible	  with	   respect	   to	  peaceful	  use	  of	  nuclear	  materials.	  “For	  the	  AKP,”	  in	  the	  panelist’s	  estimation,	  “an	  NPT-­‐based	  ‘fundamental	   right	   to	   enrichment’	   is	   embraced	   as	   an	   inalienable	   fact	   of	   the	   treaty.	   By	  




contrast,	   the	  United	  States	   interprets	  Article	   IV	  more	  restrictively,	  viewing	   it	  as	  affording	  compliant	  non-­‐nuclear	  weapon	  states	  a	  right	  to	  nuclear	  power,	  but	  not	  the	  full	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle	  with	  all	  its	  dual-­‐use	  risks.”	  Turkey	  finds	  this	  stance	  hypocritical.	  	  Panelists	   spoke	   at	   great	   length	   about	   structural	   impediments	   confronting	   U.S.-­‐Turkish	   relations	   on	   the	   NPT.	   Changes	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   review	   in	  Turkey,	  due	  in	  large	  measure	  to	  changes	  in	  civil-­‐military	  relations	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  AKP,	  have	  created	  new	  obstacles	   in	  U.S.-­‐Turkish	  relations.	  Changes	  and	  complications	  are	  also	  evident	   within	   U.S.	   decision-­‐making	   within	   the	   Pentagon	   and	   the	   State	   Department.	  “Asymmetries	  in	  assets	  and	  interests”	  are	  also	  important	  structural	  factors	  in	  bilateral	  U.S.-­‐Turkish	   nonproliferation	   cooperation.	   Turkey	   has	   more	   finite	   personnel,	   expertise,	   and	  financial	   resources	  available	   to	  advance	   its	   security	  and	  economic	   interests	  on	   the	  world	  stage.	  There	   is	  also	  some	  degree	  of	  distrust	  regarding	  U.S-­‐Turkish	  intelligence	  sharing	  on	  nuclear	  issues,	  stemming	  in	  part	  from	  the	  intelligence	  failures	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  Iraq	  War.	   Lastly,	   given	   the	   recent	   establishment	   of	   the	   think	   tank	   sector	   in	   Ankara,	  governmental	  expertise	  in	  Turkey	  receives	  only	  modest	  support	  from	  civilian	  think	  tanks.	  Panelists	   actively	   discussed	   actionable	   opportunities	   in	   improving	   bilateral	  cooperation	  on	  proliferation	   issues.	  One	  American	  participant	  proposed	   that	  U.S.-­‐Turkish	  strategic	   dialogues	  may	  help	  build	   trust	   between	   institutions	   and	   individuals	   in	   the	   long	  term	  and	  contribute	   to	  capacity	  building	   in	  Turkey,	  particularly	   in	   the	  realm	  of	  expertise	  and	  engagement.	  Mechanisms	  such	  as	  student	  exchanges	  may	  have	  a	  particularly	  positive	  effect	  on	  amassing	  greater	  technical	  and	  political	  expertise	  in	  both	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  help	  improve	  upon	  cultural	  and	  personal	  trust.	  Participants	   generally	   agreed	   that	   Turkey	   has	   no	   current	   plans	   to	   develop	   an	  indigenous	   nuclear	  weapons	   capability.	   As	   one	   participant	   pointed	   out,	   although	   Turkey	  will	  pursue	  the	  peaceful	  use	  of	  atomic	  energy,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  pursue	  nuclear	  weapons	  even	  if	   Iran	  were	  to	  acquire	  nuclear	  capabilities.	   In	  other	  words,	  a	  cascade	  effect	  starting	  from	  Iran	  and	  spreading	  through	  Turkey	  and	  throughout	  the	  region	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  improbable	  scenario.	  Nonetheless,	  considering	  Ankara's	  plans	  to	  build	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  in	  Akkuyu	  and	   Sinop,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   continue	   the	   discussion	   of	   Turkey's	   nuclear	   aspirations	   at	  future	  dialogues.	  




One	  American	  participant	  advocated	  that	   the	  U.S.	  government	  should	  embrace	   the	  cooperation	  opportunities	   that	  will	  emerge	  as	  Ankara	  begins	   to	  establish	   its	  own	  nuclear	  power	   program.	   U.S.	   industry	  may	   play	   a	   particularly	   positive	   and	   constructive	   role	   (as	  opposed	   to	   Russian	   companies)	   in	   engaging	   civilian	   nuclear	   development.	   This	  involvement	  would	  not	  only	  add	  a	  greater	  quality	  control,	  but	  also	  greater	   levels	  of	   trust	  between	  Turkey	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
	  
COUNTERING	  PROLIFERATION	  	  Turkish	  and	  American	  participants	  came	  to	  agreement	  on	  a	  number	  of	  key	  points.	  Turkey	  is	   indeed	   a	   natural	   geographic	   and	   strategic	   chokepoint	   in	   the	   greater	   Middle	   East	   and	  therefore	  constitutes	  a	  vital	  region	  in	  guarding	  against	  violations	  of	  the	  NPT.	  American	  and	  Turkish	  participants	  also	  affirmed	  that	  Turkey	  has	  been	  a	  party	  to	  multiple	  multinational	  agreements	  on	  proliferation	  that	  have	  been	  enacted	  under	  a	  number	  of	  auspices.	  Turkish	  participants	  further	  clarified	  which	  government	  ministries	  are	  responsible	  for	  overseeing	  licensing	  of	  various	  dual	  use	  components	  manufactured	  in	  and	  transferred	  through	   the	   country.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Ministry	   of	   Defense,	   Ministry	   of	  Economy,	   the	   Turkish	   Atomic	   Energy	   Agency,	   and	   other	   groups	   each	   play	   a	   role	   in	  overseeing	  production	  and	  trade	  in	  products	  related	  to	  the	  nuclear	  industry.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	   various	   laws	   have	   been	   enacted	   domestically	   that	   are	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  international	   regime.	   Turkish	   participants	   also	   asserted	   that	   border	   security	   has	   been	  improved	  upon	  and	  modernized	  over	  recent	  years.	  These	  improvements	  comprise	  both	  the	  implementation	   and	   use	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   technology	   as	  well	   as	   an	   expansion	   of	   training	  among	   Turkish	   personnel.	   One	   Turkish	   participant	   emphasized	   that	   U.S.	   cooperation	   in	  these	  reforms,	  as	  well	  as	   intelligence	  sharing,	  has	  been	  critical	   to	   the	  success	  achieved	   in	  recent	  years.	  Other	   Turkish	   participants	   asserted	   that	   cooperation	   between	   the	   United	   States	  could	  be	  further	  augmented.	  An	  important	  obstacle,	  some	  Turkish	  participants	  contended,	  was	   continued	   lack	   of	   trust	   between	   various	   Turkish	   agencies	   and	  ministries	   as	  well	   as	  




with	   U.S.	   representatives.	   Participants	   identified	   that	   the	   United	   States	   could	   improve	  relations	  with	  the	  Turkish	  Interior	  Ministry	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Customs	  and	  Trade.	  	  
CONCLUSIONS	  	  The	  dialogue	  delivered	  a	  number	  of	  important	  findings:	  	  	  
• Turkey	   and	   the	  United	   States	   possess	   a	   strong,	  multifaceted	   relationship	   that	   has	  withstood	  serious	  challenges	  and	  disagreements.	  There	  is	  mutual	  consensus	  on	  the	  two	   countries’	   security	   interests	   even	   though	   there	   is	   some	   level	   of	   disagreement	  regarding	   the	   nature	   and	   urgency	   of	   certain	   issues.	   Turkish	   and	   American	  participants	   acknowledged	   that	   an	   undercurrent	   of	   distrust,	   specifically	   with	  reference	   to	   perceived	   threats	   to	   Turkey’s	   sovereignty,	   did	   plague	   bilateral	  relations.	  
• The	   United	   States	   and	   Turkey	   are	   in	   strong	   agreement	   on	   the	   need	   to	   maintain	  NATO’s	   guarantees	   of	   extended	   deterrence.	   Both	   countries	   view	   NATO’s	   nuclear	  deterrent	   as	   an	   essential	   component	   in	   maintaining	   the	   cohesion	   of	   the	   alliance.	  Although	  Ankara	  contends	  that	  Iran	  should	  not	  be	  explicitly	  labeled	  the	  focal	  point	  of	   that	   defense,	   both	   countries	   agree	   that	   NATO’s	  missile	   defense	   system	  may	   be	  useful	  as	  a	  deterrent.	  
• There	  is	  some	  disagreement	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Turkey	  on	  the	  meaning	  and	   implementation	   of	   the	  NPT.	  While	   both	   states	   remain	   committed	   to	   the	  NPT,	  disagreement	   exists	   over	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   state’s	   “inalienable”	   right	   to	   peaceful	  nuclear	  development.	  Moreover,	   there	   is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  uncertainty	  as	   to	  how	  the	  NPT	  should	  be	  enforced	  with	  respect	  to	  Iran’s	  nascent	  nuclear	  program.	  
• Despite	   some	   initial	   American	   misgivings	   to	   the	   contrary,	   Turkish	   participants	  avowed	   that	   Ankara	   possesses	   no	   interest	   in	   developing	   a	   nuclear	   weapons	  program.	  Most	  American	  and	  Turkish	  participants	   agreed	   that	   the	  proliferation	  of	  illicit	   nuclear	   programs	   in	   the	   greater	   Middle	   East	   is	   not	   inevitable	   should	   Iran	  develop	  a	  nuclear	  weapon.	  




• Due	   to	   the	   country’s	   unique	   geographic	   location,	   counter-­‐proliferation	   efforts	   in	  Turkey	   are	  deemed	   essential	   to	   upholding	   the	  NPT.	  Turkey	   and	   the	  United	   States	  have	  worked	  closely	  on	  reforming	  and	  expanding	  Turkey’s	  capacity	  to	  monitor	  illicit	  trafficking	   at	   its	   borders.	   Nevertheless,	   American	   and	   Turkish	   officials	   must	  continue	  to	   further	  breakdown	  mutual	  distrust	  and	  bureaucratic	  resistance	  within	  Turkey.	  
	   In	  summary,	  a	  number	  of	  Turkish	  and	  American	  participants	  advocated	  the	  use	  of	  strategic	   dialogues	   as	   a	  means	   of	   furthering	   discussing	   issues	   beset	   by	  mistrust.	   This	   is	  applicable	  when	  Turkish	  sovereignty,	  American	  national	  interests,	  and	  intelligence	  sharing	  are	  seen	  at	  stake.	  Participants	  generally	  agreed	  that	  much	  work	  remains	  in	  developing	  and	  expanding	  Turkey’s	  capacity	  to	  confront	  challenges	  related	  to	  nuclear	  proliferation.	  Track	  II	  dialogues,	  as	  well	  as	  greater	  civil	  and	  academic	  engagement,	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  building	  upon	  the	  expertise	  and	  interest	  that	  currently	  exists	  in	  Turkey.	  
	  
	  
